Research Article

Pragmatic Diversification in ASEAN: Strategic Responses to Trade War Ripple Effects in 2025

Hengki Mangiring Parulian Simarmata [1*], Poltak Pardamean Simarmata [2]

[1] Management, Universitas Murni Teguh PSDKU Pematangsiantar, Indonesia 1; e-mail : hengkisimarmata.mm@gmail.com

[2] Management, Universitas Murni Teguh PSDKU Pematangsiantar, Indonesia 1; e-mail : simarmata.poltak@gmail.com

* Corresponding Author : Hengki Mangiring Parulian Simarmata

Abstract: This study explores how selected ASEAN countries Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand strategically diversified their trade partnerships in response to the global trade war ripple effects in 2025. Amid intensifying geopolitical tension, technological decoupling, and rising non-tariff trade barriers, these countries have adopted distinct strategies: Vietnam pursues export-led realignment, Indonesia promotes resource-based sovereignty, and Thailand engages in hybrid sectoral diplomacy. Through qualitative content analysis of trade policy documents and institutional reports, the study identifies a shared pattern of reduced dependence on traditional powers while highlighting the fragmented nature of ASEAN-wide coordination. The findings offer new insights into "pragmatic diversification"—a flexible and nationally calibrated trade strategy. Although ASEAN's collective frameworks remain secondary to national priorities, the country-level strategies show promise for enhancing regional resilience. The study contributes to the literature by connecting strategic trade theory with current policy evidence, offering a forward-looking, comparative assessment of diversification under trade war disruption. It concludes with implications for regional policy coherence and institutional capacity building.

Keywords: ASEAN Trade Strategy; Geoeconomics; Pragmatic Diversification; Trade Realignment

1. Introduction

The global trade landscape has become increasingly turbulent, marked by intensified geopolitical rivalries, the fragmentation of multilateral trade agreements, and the rising weaponization of interdependence. (Hopewell, 2022). Among the regions most affected by these dynamics is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which now finds itself at the nexus of the world's most consequential economic and strategic shifts. As of 2025, the aftershocks of prolonged trade wars particularly between the United States and China continue to disrupt established global value chains, reshape investment flows, and catalyze new forms of economic alliances (Frost, 2021). In this climate of uncertainty, ASEAN's capacity to navigate these pressures through strategic trade diversification has become both a regional imperative and a subject of global significance (A. D. Ba, 2023; X. Ma et al., 2024).

ASEAN, comprising ten diverse economies with a combined population exceeding 650 million, is one of the fastest-growing trade blocs in the world (Shimizu, 2021). The region's trade openness, proximity to major global supply routes, and integration within multilateral pacts such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—position it as a critical hub in global commerce (Shimizu, 2021). However, these same characteristics also

render it vulnerable to external shocks, particularly in the context of ongoing trade conflicts, technological decoupling, and emerging regulatory challenges, such as the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the U.S. CHIPS Act 2.0 (B. Lim et al., 2021; Sun et al., 2024). These developments, which intensified in 2025, have fundamentally altered the way ASEAN member states conceptualize their trade policies and economic sovereignty.

In response to these disruptions, ASEAN countries have increasingly adopted strategies of trade diversification, both to reduce dependency on dominant powers and to build greater economic resilience. (Leu, 2011). This shift is visible in the realignment of export markets, the recalibration of supply chains, and the exploration of new trade corridors with India, the Gulf States, and the European Union.

However, the current academic literature lacks a unified, forward-looking assessment of these responses. Many studies remain retrospective, focusing on the 2018–2020 trade war period. They often treat ASEAN as a monolithic bloc, ignoring deep political and institutional divergences between member states (A. Ba, 2014; Cooper & Cannon, 2024; Sundram, 2023). There is also a limited understanding of how new trade barriers—such as digital standards and environmental regulations—are shaping national responses. These gaps form the core research problem that this paper addresses. The following research questions guide this study:

a. How are selected ASEAN countries reconfiguring their trade strategies in 2025 in response to global trade war disruptions?
b. To what extent do national strategies align or diverge from one another, and what does this imply for ASEAN's regional coherence?

The study adopts a comparative, multi-country approach focused on three ASEAN economies—Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand—to highlight contrasting yet interrelated strategies. Vietnam's export-led alignment with Western markets, Indonesia's resource-based industrial sovereignty, and Thailand's sectoral diplomacy represent distinct but instructive responses to global trade fragmentation. While these cases are nationally driven, they illuminate wider patterns in ASEAN's evolving trade posture. Theoretical insights from strategic trade theory (Brander & Spencer, 1985), regional resilience frameworks (Evenett et al., 2024), and realist institutionalism (Grieco, 1990) form the foundation for analysis. This paper contributes to existing scholarship by introducing the notion of "pragmatic diversification"—a flexible, context-dependent trade strategy employed by mid-sized economies under global uncertainty.

The novelty of this research lies in its triangulation of theory, policy, and empirical data from 2025 to provide a structured, comparative analysis of trade diversification in ASEAN. It focuses not only on reactive adjustments but also on forward-looking, nationally tailored strategies that challenge the traditional assumptions of regionalism and bloc-based integration.

2. Literature Review

The escalation of trade wars in the 21st century most notably between the United States and China has reshaped the geopolitical landscape and challenged the stability of the multilateral trading system (Knobel et al., 2024). By 2025, these conflicts have evolved beyond tariff impositions, extending into technological sovereignty, resource nationalism, and geoeconomic alignment (Dinopoulos et al., 2024; Ju et al., 2024; Knobel et al., 2024; H. Ma & Ning, 2024). In this rapidly shifting environment, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) emerges as a critical player due to its strategic location, diversified economies, and market scale (Hartig et al., 2018).

ASEAN now faces internalized pressures to restructure supply chains, diversify markets, and redefine dependencies (Xu et al., 2024). Economies such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand have taken active steps in 2025 to reduce reliance on traditional partners and adapt to a fragmented global trading order (Corning, 2022; S. Lim & Nguyen, 2024). This shift is supported by foundational literature in dependency theory and strategic trade theory (Brander & Spencer, 1985), which emphasizes the need for developing economies to reduce exposure to dominant powers. ASEAN's policy adjustments align with this imperative for diversification. Theories of regional resilience (Evenett et al., 2024) and South-South cooperation (Horner, 2016; Horner & Hulme, 2019) further frame ASEAN's evolving trade strategy. However, while these theoretical tools offer explanatory power, existing research remains descriptive primarily, focusing on past trends rather than conceptualizing forward-looking, comparative models.

Several studies chart ASEAN's historical responses to the U.S.-China trade war. For example, Panao (2024) highlight Vietnam's gains from trade diversion, while Petri and Plummer (2020) explore the cushioning effect of RCEP on intra-regional trade. However, these contributions are primarily retrospective and lack a coherent analytical framework for capturing post-pandemic transformations.

Doanh et al (2023) provides a more differentiated view, noting Vietnam's successful pivot to the EU and U.S., while Malaysia and the Philippines remain entangled with China. This heterogeneity calls for a comparative framework that respects intra-ASEAN diversity.

Moreover, the region's responses in 2025 reflect new institutional and regulatory disruptions:

a. The U.S. CHIPS Act 2.0, reshaping the semiconductor supply chain
b. The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), introducing green compliance pressure
c. The rise of India and Middle Eastern economies as viable trade partners
d. However, few studies integrate these emerging dynamics into a unified model of ASEAN's strategic diversification.

This study contributes by developing a sharper theoretical synthesis: it integrates neo-functionalism (Haas, 2020), explaining ASEAN's partial integration under external shocks, and realist institutionalism (Grieco, 1990), illustrating how member states pursue bilateral hedging strategies due to ASEAN's limited coordination. These theories form the scaffolding for analyzing both divergence and convergence in ASEAN trade behavior.

To strengthen analytical clarity, this study adopts the following comparative assumption framework:

a.   ASEAN member states differ significantly in their strategic responses based on institutional capacity, resource endowments, and trade dependencies;

b.   These responses can be categorized along three dimensions: export diversification, value-chain repositioning, and bilateral versus regional alignment;

c.   National strategies reflect rational responses to both global disruptions and domestic political economies rather than a unified ASEAN vision.

By combining descriptive policy reviews with an explicit analytical lens, the study moves beyond mapping trends to explaining strategic behavior. It fills a twofold gap: the absence of theory-driven comparative analysis and the lack of models incorporating technological and environmental disruption in ASEAN's trade planning.

3. Methods

This study adopts a qualitative research approach using content analysis to explore how selected ASEAN countries Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand respond to trade war disruptions through strategic trade diversification in 2025. Content analysis is employed to systematically interpret and extract meaning from a range of policy documents, official reports, and relevant publications (Kleinheksel et al., 2020; Trilling & Jonkman, 2018). This method is appropriate for examining the discursive construction of trade strategies and identifying patterns in policy articulation across varied national contexts.

The analysis focuses on textual data drawn from publicly accessible sources, including government trade strategies, ASEAN Secretariat reports, and policy briefs from institutions such as the WTO, UNCTAD, and ERIA (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025). Documents were selected based on their relevance to trade diversification, regional realignment, and post-2020 economic restructuring (Kleinheksel et al., 2020; Trilling & Jonkman, 2018).

The selection of Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand was purposive and theoretically grounded.

a.   Vietnam represents an export-oriented, FTA-driven economy with strong integration into global electronics and manufacturing value chains.

b.   Indonesia exemplifies a resource-based, sovereignty-focused economy pursuing downstream industrialization and protectionist approaches.

c. Thailand reflects a hybrid model, combining regional diplomatic initiatives with targeted sectoral diversification—particularly in digital trade and halal exports.

These contrasting national strategies and economic structures provide a rich comparative basis to assess the diversity of ASEAN responses, enabling the study to explore how internal heterogeneity shapes strategic adaptation (Sundram, 2024; Tan, 2020).

Data coding followed the framework of inductive content analysis. Relevant documents were read repeatedly to identify recurring terms, themes, and strategic narratives, which were then grouped into categories such as partner diversification, bilateral agreement expansion, green and digital trade initiatives, and institutional coordination. Manual coding was supported by NVivo 14 to improve reliability and transparency in thematic grouping. The results were analyzed through a cross-case synthesis to uncover both shared patterns and country-specific strategies.

To ensure credibility, data triangulation was applied using multiple document types and institutional sources (Campbell et al., 2018). Peer discussions were used to refine interpretations and enhance analytical consistency. As the data were drawn from open sources, ethical approval was not required, and all sources were appropriately cited (Trilling & Jonkman, 2018).

While the study provides in-depth insights into the selected cases, it does not claim broad generalizability to all ASEAN states. Nonetheless, the case selection offers analytical leverage to examine how mid-sized economies with divergent institutional logics and development trajectories recalibrate trade strategies under uncertainty.

4. Results and Discussion

The findings from content analysis of trade policy documents and institutional communications across Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand reveal three core themes that characterize ASEAN's strategic response to global trade disruptions in 2025:

a. Diversification of trade partners beyond traditional alignments,

b. Repositioning within restructured global value chains, and

c. Adaptive engagement with new trade regimes, particularly green and digital standards.

These themes reflect ASEAN's evolving strategy to maintain competitiveness and mitigate vulnerability to ongoing trade war ripple effects, especially those stemming from intensified U.S.-China techno-economic rivalry, post-pandemic realignments, and non-tariff regulatory shifts such as the EU's CBAM and U.S. export restrictions under the CHIPS Act 2.0 (Doanh et al., 2023; Evenett et al., 2024). Each theme aligns with specific theoretical frameworks used in this study: strategic trade theory explains Vietnam's export focus (Brander & Spencer, 1985), realist institutionalism frames Indonesia's sovereignty approach (Grieco, 1990), and neo-functionalism informs Thailand's partial integration and regional diplomacy (Haas, 2020).

Vietnam emerges as the most agile case in leveraging export diversification. Between 2022 and 2025, the country experienced over 25% growth in non-China-oriented exports, particularly to the U.S., EU, and Latin America according to the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025). Vietnam's trade narrative emphasizes "multi-directional economic diplomacy," strategically positioning itself as an alternative to China in electronics and manufacturing. This reflects Brander & Spencer's (1985) strategic trade theory, where state-backed industrial policy enhances competitiveness in high-growth sectors. Vietnam's CPTPP and bilateral FTA participation reinforce this strategy. However, Vietnam's approach may risk overexposure to Western technological standards and geopolitical pressure, especially if U.S. export controls become more restrictive (Ramadhan, 2022).

Indonesia, in contrast, pursues a resource-sovereignty strategy consistent with realist institutionalist thought (Grieco, 1990). The ban on raw mineral exports and emphasis on domestic value addition reflect a drive for bargaining power and industrial control. Supporters argue this promotes long-term resilience and domestic capacity (Siregar, 2024), but this strategy risks alienating foreign partners and delaying FTAs, especially with the EU, due to perceptions of protectionism and WTO compliance issues (Freund et al., 2024). Additionally, Indonesia's limited progress on institutional reform and digital readiness may weaken its ability to adapt to green trade standards.

Thailand adopts a hybrid approach, combining South-South partnerships with digital economy integration. Its focus on halal food, EVs, and DEAs with Korea, the UK, and Singapore illustrates Haas (2020) neo-functionalism, where external pressures generate sectoral cooperation. Thailand's diversified outreach offers flexibility and soft diplomacy gains (Anuchitworawong, 2010). However, Thailand's domestic fragmentation—illustrated by legislative delays in DEA ratification—limits institutional agility, and this may constrain the full realization of its external strategy (Horner & Hulme, 2019).

Despite differences, all three countries share a clear trend: reduced reliance on traditional power blocs (China and the U.S.) and expanded bilateral diversification, confirming the "selective globalism" thesis by Evenett and Fritz (2024). However, these strategies remain fragmented nationally and have limited regional coherence, which challenges optimistic claims about ASEAN-wide strategic alignment (Petri & Plummer, 2020). ASEAN-level frameworks like RCEP or the Single Window Initiative remain underutilized (Panao, 2024).

Furthermore, compliance with green and digital trade standards varies, with Vietnam and Thailand showing policy commitment while Indonesia lags. This inconsistency reflects deeper tensions between competitiveness and sovereignty, reinforcing the institutional divergence within ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025; Horner & Hulme, 2019).

These differentiated behaviors suggest that ASEAN is less a unified bloc and more a collection of strategic experiments—each navigating uncertainty through domestic political-economic lenses. While the theoretical frameworks help explain these national strategies, each

approach carries distinct limitations: Vietnam's external dependency, Indonesia's regulatory insularity, and Thailand's institutional inertia. Acknowledging these constraints is essential to assessing the sustainability of diversification as a long-term strategy. In sum, ASEAN's strategic trade diversification in 2025 illustrates "pragmatic diversification"—a recalibration, not rejection, of global integration. This hybrid and adaptive posture embodies ASEAN's emerging identity as a testing ground for trade resilience in the Global South.

5. Conclusions

This study addressed the urgent problem of insufficient scholarly attention to how ASEAN member states are adapting to the ripple effects of global trade wars through strategic trade diversification in the post-pandemic and geoeconomically fragmented world of 2025. While previous literature has focused on the early phases of the trade war or treated ASEAN as a homogeneous bloc, this research highlighted the need for a more granular, country-specific understanding of how member states are reconfiguring their trade partnerships amid rising technological decoupling, regulatory barriers, and supply chain realignments.

The key findings demonstrate that ASEAN's response is not uniform but strategically differentiated, reflecting diverse political economies and institutional capacities. Vietnam has pursued outward-facing diversification, integrating into Western-centric value chains through high-standard FTAs. Indonesia emphasizes resource sovereignty and domestic value capture with a more cautious approach to international alignment. Thailand applies a hybrid model, engaging in sectoral diplomacy and expanding into digital and halal trade channels.

Conceptually, this study advances the idea of "pragmatic diversification" as a theoretical contribution that bridges strategic trade theory and realist institutionalism. It conceptualizes ASEAN member states not as passive adapters but as strategic agents selectively recalibrating trade policy in response to shifting global power dynamics, regulatory pressures, and national development priorities. This model helps scholars and policymakers better understand how middle-income economies navigate trade volatility without complete decoupling or over-dependence. The implications are twofold. At the domestic level, ASEAN states must:

a. Align trade and industrial policy under a cohesive national framework;
b. Build institutional capacity in regulatory agility, particularly in digital trade and green standards compliance;
c. Engage local private sectors and SMEs in trade diversification strategies, especially in manufacturing and agribusiness.

At the regional level, deeper ASEAN economic coordination is critical. This includes:

a. Operationalizing existing frameworks like RCEP through measurable trade facilitation benchmarks;
b. Accelerating harmonization of digital economy standards and customs systems via ASEAN Single Window;

    c. Creating an ASEAN Diversification Index or Monitoring Mechanism to track country-level progress and gaps in real time.

These policy recommendations are intended to shift ASEAN from rhetorical convergence to institutionalized trade resilience. They also aim to foster greater inclusiveness in the ASEAN trade strategy by incorporating the private sector and civil society into long-term planning.

While the study provides valuable comparative insights, it is not without limitations. It relies on publicly available documents, which may not capture informal negotiations and strategic deliberations. Moreover, the analysis is focused on three countries and may not represent the full spectrum of ASEAN responses. Therefore, generalizations should be made with caution.

Future research should adopt mixed-method approaches that include elite interviews, firm-level impact assessments, and cross-country quantitative modeling. Broadening the analysis to include countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Laos will enhance the robustness and generalizability of the findings. Additionally, greater scrutiny of ASEAN's institutional tools—such as digital platform integration, carbon market readiness, and regulatory synchronization—is needed to understand their role in enabling or constraining regional trade alignment.

In conclusion, this study argues that ASEAN is not merely adapting to the turbulence of the global trade landscape—it is actively redefining its economic identity. Through strategic diversification, selective alignment, and institutional experimentation, ASEAN countries are shaping a development path that balances resilience, competitiveness, and national autonomy. This posture represents a valuable case study for the Global South and enriches theoretical debates on how emerging economies assert agency in a fragmented and multipolar trade regime.

References

[1] Anuchitworawong, C. (2010). The Value of Principles-Based Governance Practices and the Attenuation of Information Asymmetry. Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, 17(2), 171–207. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10690-010-9114-4

[2] ASEAN Secretariat. (2025). ASEAN Investment Report 2024 : ASEAN Economic Community 2025 and Foreign Direct Investment. https://asean.org/book/asean-investment-report-2024-asean-economic-community-2025-and-foreign-direct-investment/

[3] Ba, A. (2014). Institutional divergence and convergence in the Asia-Pacific? ASEAN in practice and in theory. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 27(2), 295–318. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.889082

[4] Ba, A. D. (2023). Diversification's legitimation challenges: ASEAN and its Myanmar predicament. International Affairs, 99(3), 1063–1085. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad061

[5] Brander, J. A., & Spencer, B. J. (1985). Export subsidies and international market share rivalry. Journal of International Economics, 18(1–2), 83–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(85)90006-6

[6] Campbell, R., Goodman-Williams, R., Feeney, H., & Fehler-Cabral, G. (2018). Assessing Triangulation Across Methodologies, Methods, and Stakeholder Groups: The Joys, Woes, and Politics of Interpreting Convergent and Divergent Data. American Journal of Evaluation, 41, 125–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/1098214018804195

[7] Cooper, A. F., & Cannon, B. J. (2024). Contested informality in regional institutional design: A comparative analysis of <scp>ASEAN</scp> and the Quad. Global Policy, 15(1), 40–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13335

[8] Corning, G. (2022). ASEAN and the Regime Complex for Digital Trade in the Asia-Pacific. Journal of World Trade. https://doi.org/10.54648/trad2022038

[9] Dinopoulos, E., Heins, G., & Unel, B. (2024). Tariff wars, unemployment, and top incomes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 148, 103616. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103616

[10] Doanh, N. K., Doan, H. Q., & Heo, Y. (2023). Impact of imitation ability on ASEAN countries' intra-industry trade: a system GMM approach. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 28(2), 692–715. https://doi.org/10.1080/13547860.2021.1892473

[11] Evenett, S., Jakubik, A., Martín, F., & Ruta, M. (2024). The return of industrial policy in data. The World Economy, 47(7), 2762–2788. https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13608

[12] Freund, C., Mattoo, A., Mulabdic, A., & Ruta, M. (2024). Is US trade policy reshaping global supply chains? Journal of International Economics, 152, 104011.

[13] Frost, E. L. (2021). The New Geopolitics of Trade and Investment in Asia: Multilateralism, Regionalism, Protectionism, or All of the Above? Asia Policy, 16(4), 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2021.0044

[14] Grieco, J. M. (1990). Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Problem of International Cooperation. In Cooperation among Nations (pp. 27–50). Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501725043-004

[15] Haas, E. B. (2020). Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. University of Notre Dame Press.

[16] Hartig, J. H., Zarull, M. A., & Munawar, M. (2018). Preface. Aquatic Ecosystem Health & Management, 21(4), 373–377. https://doi.org/10.1080/14634988.2018.1540232

[17] Hopewell, K. (2022). Beyond U.S.-China Rivalry: Rule Breaking, Economic Coercion, and the Weaponization of Trade. AJIL Unbound, 116, 58–63. https://doi.org/10.1017/aju.2022.3

[18] Horner, R. (2016). A New Economic Geography of Trade and Development? Governing South–South Trade, Value Chains and Production Networks. Territory, Politics, Governance, 4(4), 400–420. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2015.1073614

[19] Horner, R., & Hulme, D. (2019). From International to Global Development: New Geographies of 21 st Century Development. Development and Change, 50(2), 347–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12379

[20] Ju, J., Ma, H., Wang, Z., & Zhu, X. (2024). Trade wars and industrial policy competitions: Understanding the US-China economic conflicts. Journal of Monetary Economics, 141, 42–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.10.012

[21] Kleinheksel, A., Rockich-Winston, N., Tawfik, H., & Wyatt, T. (2020). Demystifying Content Analysis. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education, 84. https://doi.org/10.5688/ajpe7113

[22] Knobel, A. Y., Ponomareva, O. V., & Sedalishchev, V. V. (2024). Impact of Trade Wars on the Global Economy and on the Macroeconomic and Sectoral Indicators of the USA and China. Economic Policy, 19(5), 30–53. https://doi.org/10.18288/1994-5124-2024-5-30-53

[23] Leu, G. (2011). ASEAN's Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) Strategy. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(2), 31–64. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341103000203

[24] Lim, B., Hong, K., Yoon, J., Chang, J.-I., & Cheong, I. (2021). Pitfalls of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Energies, 14(21), 7303. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14217303

[25] Lim, S., & Nguyen, A. P. T. (2024). Shifting Trade Winds: Southeast Asia's Response to the United States–People's Republic of China Trade Dispute. Asian Development Review. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0116110524400134

[26] Ma, H., & Ning, J. (2024). The return of protectionism: Prospects for Sino-US trade relations in the wake of the trade war. China Economic Quarterly International, 4(3), 182–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ceqi.2024.09.003

[27] Ma, X., Ma, L., Arshad, R., & Alofaysan, H. (2024). Sustainable development in ASEAN : The role of trade diversification, government revenue, and natural resources. Natural Resources Forum. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-8947.12526

[28] Panao, R. (2024). Winning hearts in Southeast Asia? News sentiment on China amidst the US–PRC trade war. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/20578911241252692

[29] Petri, P. A., & Plummer, M. G. (2020). East Asia Decouples from the United States: Trade War, COVID-19, and East Asia's New Trade Blocs. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3630294

[30] Ramadhan, I. (2022). ASEAN Consensus and Forming Cybersecurity Regulation in Southeast Asia. Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Contemporary Risk Studies, ICONIC-RS 2022, 31 March-1 April 2022, South Jakarta, DKI Jakarta, Indonesia. https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.31-3-2022.2320684

[31] Shimizu, K. (2021). The ASEAN Economic Community and the RCEP in the world economy. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, 10(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1907881

[32] Siregar, Y. I. (2024). Pathways towards net-zero emissions in Indonesia's energy sector. Energy, 308, 133014. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2024.133014

[33] Sun, X., Mi, Z., Cheng, L., Coffman, D., & Liu, Y. (2024). The carbon border adjustment mechanism is inefficient in addressing carbon leakage and results in unfair welfare losses. Fundamental Research, 4(3), 660–670. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fmre.2023.02.026

[34] Sundram, P. (2023). ASEAN as network governance: An alternative lens to evaluate policymaking and performance. F1000Research, 12, 1073. https://doi.org/10.12688/f1000research.136338.2

[35] Sundram, P. (2024). ASEAN cooperation to combat transnational crime: progress, perils, and prospects. Frontiers in Political Science. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2024.1304828

[36] Tan, S. S. (2020). Consigned to hedge: Southeast Asia and America's 'free and open Indo-Pacific' strategy. International Affairs, 96, 131–148. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz227

[37] Trilling, D., & Jonkman, J. (2018). Scaling up Content Analysis. Communication Methods and Measures, 12, 158–174. https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2018.1447655

[38] Xu, Y., Jia, F., Wang, L., & Chen, L. (2024). Can digital transformation improve firm resilience to supply chain disruption? The role of diversification strategies. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 30(5), 100952. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2024.100952